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Abstract 
I  analyze  the  salient  features  of  networks  and  point  out  the  similarities  between  the 
economic  structure  of  networks  and  the  structure  of  vertically  related  industries.  The 
analysis  focuses  on  positive consumption  and  production  externalities,  commonly  called 
network  externalities.  I  discuss  their  sources  and  their  effects  on  pricing  and  market 
structure.  I  distinguish  between  results  that  do  not  depend  on  the  underlying  industry 
microstructure  (the  'macro'  approach)  and those that do (the  'micro' approach).  I  analyze 
the  issues  of  compatibility,  coordination  to  technical  standards,  interconnection  and 
interoperability,  and  their effects  on  pricing  and  quality  of services  and  on  the  value of 
network links in various ownership structures. I also briefly discuss the issue of interconnec- 
tion fees for bottleneck facilities. 
I.  Introduction  2 
Network  industries  play  a  crucial  role  in  modem  life.  The  modem  economy 
would  be  very  much  diminished  without  the  transportation,  communications, 
information,  and  railroad  networks.  This  essay  will  analyze  the  major  economic 
features  of networks.  In the course  of the analysis  it will become clear that  many 
important  non-network  industries  share  many  essential  economic  features  with 
network  industries.  These  non-network  industries  are  characterized  by  strong 
complementary  relations.  Thus,  the  lessons  of  networks  can  be  applied  to 
]Plenary  session  address,  E.A.R.I.E.  conference,  Chania,  Greece,  September  1994. I  thank  Larry 
White  for helpful comments. 
2The literature on networks is so extensive that it is futile to attempt to cover it. This paper discusses 
only some issues  that  arise  in networks  and attempts  to point out areas  in which  further research  is 
necessary. 
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industries  where  vertical  relations  play  a  crucial  role;  conversely, the  economic 
and legal learning developed in the analysis of vertically related industries  can be 
applied  to network industries. 
2.  Classification  of networks 
Formally, networks are composed of links  that connect nodes.  It is inherent in 
the structure of a network that many components of a network are required for the 
provision of a  typical  service.  Thus,  network components are  complementary to 
each  other.  Fig.  1 represents  the  emerging  information  superhighway  network. 
Clearly,  services demanded by consumers are composed of many complementary 
components.  For example,  interactive  ordering  while  browsing in  a  'department 
store' as it appears in successive video frames requires a number of components: a 
database engine at the service provider, transmission of signals, decoding through 
an  interface,  display  on a  TV or computer monitor,  etc.  Clearly,  there  are  close 
substitutes  for each of these components; for example,  transmission can be  done 
through a cable TV line,  a fixed telephone line,  a wireless satellite,  PCN, etc.; the 
in-home interface may be a TV-top box or an add-on to a PC, etc.  It is likely that 
the combinations of various components will not result in identical services. Thus, 
the information superhighway will  provide substitutes made of complements; this 
is  a typical feature  of networks. 
Fig. 2 shows this feature in a simple star telephone network. A phone call from 
A to B is composed of AS (access to the switch of customer A), BS (access to the 
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switch of customer B), and switching services at S. Despite the fact that goods AS 
and  BS  look  very  similar  and  have  the  same  industrial  classification, they  are 
complements  and not substitutes.  3 
Networks where services AB and BA  are distinct are named 'two-way' networks 
in Economides and White (1994).  Two-way networks include railroad, road, and 
many telecommunications networks. When one of AB  or BA  is unfeasible, or does 
not make economic sense, or when there is no sense of direction in the network so 
that AB  and BA  are identical, then the network is called a  one-way network. In a 
typical one-way network, there are two types of components, and composite goods 
are formed only by combining a component of each type, and customers are often 
not identified with components but instead demand composite goods. For example, 
broadcasting and paging are one-way networks 4 
The classification in network type (one-way or two-way) is not a function of the 
topological structure of the network. Rather, it depends on the interpretation of the 
structure to represent a specific service. For example, the network of Fig. 3 can be 
interpreted as a  two-way telephone network where SA represents a  local switch in 
city A, A i  represents a  customer in city A, and  similarly for  SB  and Bj.  5 In this 
network,  there  are two  types of local phone  calls AiSAA ~ and BiSBB  ~,  as well as 
3AS and BS can also be components of substitute  phone calls ASC and BSC. 
4The 1994 spectrum auction will allow for a large two-way paging network. 
5In this network, we may identify end-nodes, such as A  i and B, end-links, such as ASA and SsB~, the 
interface or gateway SAS  ~, and switches S  A and SR. 676  N. Economides / Int. J. Ind. Organ. 14 (1996) 673-699 
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Fig. 3. A simple local and long distance network. 
long distance phone call AiSASBBj. We can also interpret the network of Fig.  3 as 
an automatic teller machine network (ATM). Then a transaction (say a withdrawal) 
from bank Bj from ATM Ai is AflASBB  j. Connections AflaA k and BjSsB  ~ may be 
feasible but there is no demand for them. 
We have pointed out earlier that the  crucial  relationship  in both one-way and 
two-way networks is the complementarity between the pieces of the network. This 
crucial economic relationship  is also often observed between different classes of 
goods in non-network industries.  In fact, Economides and White (1994) point out 
that  a  pair  of vertically  related  industries  is  formally  equivalent  to  a  one-way 
network.  Fig.  4  can represent two industries  of complementary goods  A  and B, 
where  consumers  demand  combinations  A~Bj.  Notice  that  this  formulation  is 
formally identical to our long-distance  network of Fig.  3  in the ATM interpreta- 
tion. 
The discussion so far was carried under the assumption of compatibility,  i.e. that 
various  links  and  nodes  on  the  network  are  costlessly  combinable  to  produce 
demanded  goods. We  have  pointed  out  that  links  on  a  network  are  potentially 
complementary, but it is compatibility  that makes  complementarity  actual.  Some 
network  goods  and  some  vertically  related  goods  are  immediately  combinable 
because of their inherent properties. However, for many complex products, actual N. Economides  /  Int.  J. Ind.  Organ.  14 (1996) 673-699  677 
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Fig. 4. A pair of vertically related markets. 
complementarity can be achieved only through the adherence to specific technical 
compatibility  standards.  Thus,  many  providers  of network  or  vertically  related 
goods have the option of making their products partially or fully incompatible with 
components produced by other firms.  This  can be  done  through the  creation  of 
proprietary designs or the outright exclusion or refusal to interconnect with some 
firms. 
Traditionally, networks were analyzed under the assumption that each network 
was owned by a single firm.  Thus, economic research focused on the efficient use 
of the network structure as well as on the appropriate allocation of costs  6 In the 
70s, partly prompted by the antitrust suit against AT&T, there was a considerable 
amount of research on economies of scope, i.e.  on the efficiency gains from joint 
operation of complementary components of networks.  7 
Once  one  of  the  most  important  networks  (the  AT&T  telecommunications 
network in the US)  was broken to pieces,  economic research focused in the  80s 
and 90s on issues of interconnection and compatibility. Similar research on issues 
of compatibility was prompted by the reduced role of IBM in the 80s and 90s in 
the setting of technical standards  in computer hardware and software.  Significant 
reductions  in  costs  also  contributed  and  will  contribute  to  the  transformation 
toward fragmented ownership in the telecommunications sector in both the United 
States  and  abroad.  Costs  of  transmission  have  fallen  dramatically  with  the 
introduction  of  fiberoptic  lines.  Switching  costs  have  followed  the  fast  cost 
6See Sharkey (1995) for an excellent survey. 
7See Baumol et al. (1982). 678  N. Economides  /  Int. J. Ind. Organ. 14 (1996)  673-699 
decreases  of  microchips  and  integrated  circuits.  These  cost  reductions  have 
transformed  the  telecommunications industry  from  a  natural  monopoly  to  an 
oligopoly•  The  same  cost  reductions  have  made  many  new  services,  such  as 
interactive video and interactive games, feasible at low cost. Technological change 
now  allows  for joint transmission of digital  signals of  various  communications 
services. Thus, the monopoly of the last link closest to home is in the process of 
being eliminated,  8 since both telephone lines and cable lines (and in some cases 
•  910  PCS  and terrestrial satellites) will provide similar services. ' 
In a  network  where  complementary as  well  as  substitute links are  owned by 
different  firms,  the  questions  of  interconnection, compatibility, interoperability, 
and coordination of quality of services become of paramount importance. We will 
examine  these  issues  in  detail  in  the  next  few  sections.  We  first  focus  on  a 
fundamental property  of networks,  i.e.  the  fact  that  they  exhibit network  exter- 
nalities. 
3.  Network externalities 
Networks exhibit positive consumption and production externalities. A  positive 
consumption externality (or network externality) signifies the fact that the value of 
a unit of the good increases with the number of units sold. To economists, this fact 
seems quite counterintuitive, since they all know that, except for potatoes in Irish 
famines, market demand slopes downwards. Thus, the earlier statement, "the value 
of a unit of a good increases with the number of units sold,"  should be interpreted 
as  "the value of a unit of the good increases with the expected  number of units to 
be sold."  Thus, the demand slopes downward but shifts upward with increases in 
the number of units expected to be  sold. 
81t is already eliminated in some parts of the United Kingdom, where cable TV operators offer 
telephone service at significantly  lower prices than British Telecom. 
9  These significant  changes in costs and the convergence  of communications  services open an number 
of policy questions on pricing, unbundling,  deregulation, and possibly mandated segmentation  in this 
sector. It is possible that ownership breakup of local and long distance lines is no longer necessary to 
improve competition.  For example, European Union  policy mandates  open competition  by 1998 in any 
part of the telecommunications  network, but does not advocate vertical fragmentation  of the existing 
integrated national monopolies; see European Commission (1994). The reduction in costs and the 
elimination of natural monopoly in many services may make it possible for this policy to lead the 
industry to competition. 
~°Another important  network, the airline network, faces significant  change in Europe. Airlines have 
not benefited from significant  cost reductions and technological  change; the present reform is just the 
abolition by the  European Union of the  antiquated regime of national airline monopolies, and its 
replacement by a more competitive environment. N. Economides / Int. J. Ind. Organ. 14 (1996) 673-699  679 
3.1.  Sources  of network  externalities 
The key reason for the  appearance of network externalities  is  the complemen- 
tarity  between  the  components  of  a  network.  Depending  on  the  network,  the 
externality  may  be  direct  or  indirect.  When  customers  are  identified  with 
components,  the  externality  is  direct.  Consider  for  example  a  typical  two-way 
network,  such  as  the  local  telephone  network  of  Fig.  2.  In  this  n-component 
network,  there  are  n(n-  1)  potential  goods.  An  additional  (n +  l th)  customer 
provides direct  externalities  to  all  other customers  in  the  network by adding  2n 
potential new goods through the provision of a complementary link (say ES) to the 
existing links. 11 
In typical one-way networks, the externality is only indirect.  When there are m 
varieties  of component A  and  n  varieties  of component B  as  in  Fig.  4  (and  all 
A-type goods are  compatible  with  all  B-type),  there  are  mn  potential  composite 
goods.  An  extra  customer  yields  indirect  externalities  to  other  customers,  by 
increasing the demand for components of types A and B  and thereby (because of 
the presence of economies of scale)  potentially increasing the number of varieties 
of each component that are available  in the market. 
Financial  exchange networks  also exhibit  indirect network externalities.  There 
are two ways in which these externalities  arise.  First,  externalities  arise  in the act 
of exchanging  assets  or  goods.  Second,  externalities  may  arise  in  the  array  of 
vertically related services that compose a  financial transaction.  These include the 
services of a broker, of bringing the offer to the floor,  matching the offer, etc.  The 
second type of externalities are similar to other vertically related markets. The first 
way in  which externalities  arise  in  financial markets  is  more important. 
The act of exchanging goods or assets brings together a trader who is willing to 
sell  with  a  trader  who is  willing  to  buy.  The  exchange brings  together the  two 
complementary goods, 'willingness to sell at price p' (the 'offer') and 'willingness 
to buy at price p' (the 'counteroffer') and creates a composite good, the 'exchange 
transaction.' The two original goods were complementary and each had no value 
without the other one. Clearly, the availability of the counteroffer is critical for the 
exchange to  occur. Put  in  terms  commonly used  in  finance,  minimal  liquidity  is 
necessary for the transaction to occur. 
Financial  markets  also  exhibit  positive  size  externalities  in  the  sense  that  the 
increasing size (or thickness) of an exchange market increases the expected utility 
of all  participants.  Higher  participation  of traders  on  both  sides  of the  market 
(drawn from the same distribution)  decreases the variance of the expected market 
price  and  increases  the  expected  utility  of risk-averse  traders.  Ceteris  paribus, 
~ This property of two-way networks was pointed out in telecommunications networks by Rohlfs 
(1974) in a very early paper on network externalities. See also Oren and Smith (1981). 680  N. Economides  /  Int. J. Ind. Organ.  14 (1996)  673-699 
higher liquidity increases traders'  utility. Thus,  financial exchange  markets  also 
exhibit network externalities.  12'13 
3.2.  The  'macro'  approach 
There  are  two  approaches  and  two  strands  of  literature  in  the  analysis  of 
network externalities. The first approach assumes that network externalities exist, 
and  attempts  to  model  their  consequences.  I  call  this  the  'macro'  approach. 
Conceptually this approach is easier, and it has produced strong results. It was the 
predominant approach  during the  80s.  The second approach  attempts  to  find the 
root  cause  of  the  network  externalities.  I  call  this  the  'micro'  approach.  In 
industrial organization, it started with the analysis of mix-and-match models and 
has evolved to the analysis of various structures of vertically related markets.  In 
finance,  it  started  with  the  analysis  of  price  dispersion  models.  The  'micro' 
approach is harder,  and in many ways more constrained, as  it has to rely on the 
underlying microstrncture. However,  the  'micro' approach  has  a  very significant 
benefit in defining the market structure. We discuss the  'macro' approach first. 
3.2.1.  Perfect competition 
As we have noted earlier, network externalities arise out of the complementarity 
of different network pieces. Thus, they arise naturally in both one- and two-way 
networks, as well as in vertically related markets. The value of good X increases as 
more of the complementary good Y is sold, and vice versa. Thus, more of Y is sold 
as  more X  is  sold.  It follows that the value of X  increases as more of it is sold. 
This positive feedback loop seems explosive, and indeed it would be, except for 
the  inherent downward  slope  of  the  demand  curve.  To  understand this  better, 
consider a  fulfilled expectations  formulation of network externalities as  in Katz 
and Shapiro (1985),  Economides (1993b), Economides (1996a),  and Economides 
and Himmelberg (1995).  Let the willingness to pay for the nth unit of the good 
~2For a more detailed discussion  of networks in finance see Economides (1993a). Economides and 
Schwartz (1995a) discuss how to set up electronic  call markets  that bunch transactions  and execute 
them all at once. Call markets have inherently  higher liquidity  because they take advantage  of network 
externalities in exchange. Thus, transaction  costs are lower in call markets. Economides (1994a) and 
Economides and Heisler (1994) discuss how  to  increase liquidity in call markets. The survey of 
institutional  investors  reported by Economides  and Schwartz (1995b) find that many  traders who work 
in the present continuous  market environment  would be willing  to wait a number  of hours for execution 
of their orders if they can save in transaction  costs, including  bid-ask spreads. Thus, the time is right for 
the establishment  of call markets in parallel operation with the continuous  market. 
~3 The increase  of utility in expectation  due to market thickness was pointed out by Economides  and 
Siow (1988), and earlier and in less formal terms by Garbade and Silber (1976a), Garbade and Silber 
(1976b), and Garbade and Silber (1979). The effects are  similar to those of search models as in 
Diamond (1982) and Diamond (1984). N. Economides  /  Int.  J. Ind.  Organ.  14 (1996) 673-699  681 
when n e units are expected to be sold be p(n; ne).  14 This is a decreasing function of 
its first argument because the demand slopes downward, p(n; n e) increases in ne; 
this captures the network externalities effect. At a market equilibrium of the simple 
single-period world,  expectations  are  fulfilled, n  =  n e,  thus  defining the  fulfilled 
expectations demand p(n,  n).  Fig.  5  shows  the  construction  of a  typical fulfilled 
expectations demand. Each curve D i, i =  1  ..... 4, shows the willingness to pay for 
a varying quantity n, given an expectation of sales n e =  ni. At n  =  n i, expectations 
are fulfilled and the point belongs to p(n, n) as p(ni, ng). Thus p(n, n) is constructed 
as a  collection of points p(n i, n~). 
To  avoid explosions and  infinite sales, it is reasonable to  impose limn_~  p(n, 
n) =  0;  it  then  follows  that p(n,  n)  is  decreasing  for  large  n.  Economides  and 
Himmelberg (1995)  show  that the fulfilled expectations demand is increasing for 
small n  if either one of three conditions hold: (i) the utility of every consumer in a 
network of zero size is zero, or (ii) there are immediate and large external benefits 
to network expansion for very small networks, or (iii) there is a significant density 
c,p 
D1 ~/ 
0 
p(n,n) 
f  I  I  i  I  I 
n 1 n2 n3n  4  n °  1 
Fig.  5.  Construction of the fulfilled expectations demand. 
L 
n 
]4In  this  formulation  n  and  n e  are  normalized  so  that  they  represent  market  shares  rather  than 
absolute quantities. 682  N. Economides  /  Int.  J.  Ind.  Organ.  14 (1996) 673-699 
of high-willingness-to-pay  consumers who are just indifferent on joining a network 
of  approximately  zero  size.  The  first  condition  is  straightforward  and  applies 
directly to all two-way networks.  The other two conditions  are a  bit more subtle, 
but commonly observed in networks  and  vertically related  industries. 
When the fulfilled  expectations  demand  increases  for small  n,  we  say that  the 
network  exhibits  a  positive  critical  mass  under perfect  competition.  This  means 
that,  if  we  imagine  a  constant  marginal  cost  c  decreasing  parametrically,  the 
network will  start  at  a positive  and  significant  size n °  (corresponding to marginal 
cost  c°).  For  each  smaller  marginal  cost,  c <  c °,  there  are  three  network  sizes 
consistent  with  marginal  cost pricing:  a  zero  size  network;  an  unstable  network 
size at the first intersection of the horizontal through c with p(n, n); and the Pareto 
optimal stable network size at the largest intersection of the horizontal with p(n, n). 
The  multiplicity  of equilibria  is  a  direct  result  of the  coordination  problem  that 
arises  naturally  in the typical network externalities  model.  In such a  setting,  it  is 
natural  to assume  that the  Pareto  optimal  network  size  will  result. 15 
In the presence of network externalities,  it is evident that perfect competition is 
inefficient:  The  marginal  social  benefit  of network  expansion  is  larger  than  the 
benefit  that  accrues  to a  particular  firm  under  perfect competition.  Thus,  perfect 
competition will provide a  smaller network than is  socially optimal, and for some 
relatively high marginal costs perfect competition will not provide the good while 
it  is  socially optimal to provide  it. 
One interesting  question that remains virtually unanswered is how to decentral- 
ize  the  welfare  maximizing  solution  in  the  presence  of  network  externalities. 
Clearly,  the  welfare  maximizing  solution  can  be  implemented  through  perfect 
price discrimination,  but typically such discrimination  is unfeasible.  It remains  to 
be  seen  to  what  extent  mechanisms  that  allow  for  non-linear  pricing  and  self- 
selection by consumers  will  come close to the  first best. 
3.2.2.  Monopoly 
Economides and Himmelberg  (1995)  show that a  monopolist who is  unable to 
price-discriminate  will  support  a  smaller  network  and  charge  higher  prices  than 
perfectly  competitive  firms.  This  is  despite  the  fact  that  the  monopolist  has 
influence over the expectations of the consumers, and he recognizes this influence, 
while  no perfectly competitive  firm has  such influence.  16  Influence over expecta- 
tions  drives  the  monopolist  to  higher  production,  but  the  monopolist's  profit- 
maximizing  tendency  towards  restricted  production  is  stronger  and  leads  it  to 
~sIt is  possible to  have  other  shapes of the  fulfilled  expectations  demand.  In  general  p(n,  n)  is 
quasiconcave under weak  conditions  on  the  distribution  of preferences  and  the  network externality 
function.  Then, if none of the three  causes mentioned above are  not present, the fulfilled  expectations 
demand is downward sloping. 
~rA monopolist unable to influence  expectations  will clearly  produce less than a monopolist able  to 
influence  expectations. N. Economides / Int. J. Ind. Organ. 14 (1996) 673-699  683 
lower  production  levels  than  perfect  competition.  Thus,  consumers  and  total 
surplus  will  be  lower  in  monopoly  than  in  perfect  competition.  Therefore  the 
existence  of  network  externalities  does  not  reverse  the  standard  welfare  com- 
parison  between  monopoly  and  competition;  it  follows  that  the  existence  of 
network  externalities  cannot  be  claimed  as  a  reason  in favor  of a  monopoly 
market structure. 
3.2.3.  Oligopoly and monopolistic  competition  under compatibility 
Cournot  oligopolists  producing  compatible  components  also  have  some  in- 
fluence over expectations. A natural way to model the influence of oligopolists on 
output  expectations  is  to  assume  that  every  oligopolist  takes  the  output  of all 
others  as given and sets the  expectation of consumers of his own output.  In this 
setting,  M  compatible Cournot oligopolists  support a  network of a  size between 
monopoly (M =  1)  and  perfect competition  (M =  2).  The  analysis  can  easily be 
extended to monopolistic competition among compatible oligopolists if firms face 
downward-sloping average cost curves as shown in Fig.  6.  Firms produce on the 
downward-sloping  part  of  the  firm-scaled  fulfilled  expectations  demand.  At  a 
symmetric  equilibrium,  firm  j's  output  is  determined  at  the  intersection  of 
marginal  cost  c  and  marginal  revenue  MRj.  Price  is  read  off  the  fulfilled 
expectations  firm-scaled  inverse  demand  p(Mq,  Mq).  At  a  monopolistically 
competitive  equilibrium,  the  AC  curve  is  tangent  to  the  fulfilled  expectations 
demand at q~. 
Monopolistic  Competition  with Network 
Externalities and M Compatible  Goods 
P 
C 0  _ ~'_ -_. 
.;'-  Ac 
J 
0  qO  qj  q 
Fig. 6. Monopolistic competition with network externalities and M compatible goods. 684  N. Economides  /  Int.  J.  Ind.  Organ.  14  (1996)  673-699 
3.2.4.  Oligopoly  under incompatibility 
One  of  the  most  interesting  issues  in  the  economics  of  networks  is  the 
interaction of oligopolists producing incompatible goods. A  full analysis of such a 
market,  in conjunction with the analysis  of compatible oligopolists, will  allow us 
to  determine  the  incentives  of individual  firms  to  choose  technologies  that  are 
compatible  or incompatible  with  others. 
Given any set of firms S =  {1 ..... N}, we can identify a subset of S that adheres 
to the same technical  'standard'  as a coalition. Then the partition of S  into subsets 
defines  a  coalition  structure  C  s =  {C  1  .....  Ck}. Compatibility  by  all  firms  means 
that there is a  single coalition that includes  all firms. Total incompatibility,  where 
every firm adheres  to its  own unique  standard,  means  that k =  N. 
A  number of criteria can be used to define the equilibrium coalition structure. A 
purely non-cooperative concept without  side  payments  requires  that,  after  a  firm 
joins  a  coalition,  it  is  better  off at  the  resulting  market  equilibrium,  just  from 
revenues  from  its  own  sales. ~7  At  a  non-cooperative  equilibrium  with  side 
payments, firms divide the profits of a coalition arbitrarily to induce firms to join a 
coalition. Yet firms do not cooperate in output decisions.  Katz and Shapiro (1985) 
show that  the  level  of industry  output  is  greater  under compatibility than  at  any 
equilibrium  with  some incompatible  firm(s).  This  is  not  sufficient to characterize 
the incentives  of firms  to opt for compatibility. 
Intuitively,  a  firm  benefits  from  a  move  to  compatibility  if  (i)  the  marginal 
externality  is  strong;  (ii)  it joins  a  large  coalition;  and  (iii)  it  does  not  thereby 
increase  competition to a  significant degree by its  action.  On the other hand,  the 
coalition benefits from a firm joining its  'standard' if (i) the marginal externality is 
strong;  (ii)  the  firm  that joins  the  coalition  is  large;  (iii)  competition  does  not 
increase  significantly as a result of the firm joining the coalition.  Clearly,  in both 
cases,  the second and the third criteria may create  incentives  that  are in conflict; 
this  will  help  define  the equilibrium  coalition  structure. 18 
Katz and  Shapiro  (1985)  show that  if the  costs of achieving  compatibility  are 
lower for all  firms than  the increase  in profits  because  of compatibility,  then  the 
industry move toward compatibility is socially beneficial. However, it may be true 
that the (fixed) cost of achieving compatibility is larger than the increase in profits 
for some firms, while these costs are lower than the increase  in total  surplus  from 
compatibility.  Then  profit  maximizing  firms  will  not  achieve  industry-wide 
compatibility  while  this  regime  is  socially  optimal.  Further,  if a  change leads  to 
less than industry-wide compatibility, the private incentives to standardize may be 
excessive or inadequate.  This  is  because  of the  output changes  that  a  change  of 
regime  has  on all  firms.  Similarly,  the incentive  of a  firm to produce  a  one-way 
adapter,  that allows it to achieve compatibility without affecting the compatibility 
~TSee Economides (1984), Yi and Shin (1992a), and Yi and Shin (1992b). 
~8 Economides and Flyer (1995) examine the incentives for coalition formation around compatibility 
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of other firms, may be deficient or excessive because the firm ignores the change it 
creates on other firms' profits and on consumers surplus. 
3.2.5.  Coordination  to technical  standards  with  asymmetric  technologies 
So far it was assumed that the cost of standardization was fixed and the same for 
both firms. If standardization costs are different, firms play a standards coordina- 
tion game. A  2 ×  2  version of this game is presented in Fig.  7.  Entries represent 
profits.  In  this  game,  we  will  assume  that  firm  i  has  higher  profits  when  'its' 
standard i get adopted, a >  g, b <  h.  Profits, in case of disagreement, will depend 
on  the  particulars  of the  industry.  One  standard  assumption  that  captures  many 
industries is that in case of disagreement profits will be lower than those of either 
standard,  e,  c <g;  d,  f<b.  Under  these  circumstances,  the  setting  of  either 
•  •  -  19  standard will constitute a non-cooperative equlhbrmm.  There is no guarantee that 
the highest joint profit standard will be adopted. Since consumers surplus does not 
appear in the  matrix,  there  is  no guarantee  of maximization of social  welfare  at 
equilibrium.  For an analysis with continuous  choice of standard  specification see 
Berg (1988). 
3.3.  The  'micro' approach 
The micro approach starts  with an analysis of the specific micro-structure of a 
network.  After identifying the physical aspects of a  network,  such  as nodes  and 
links,  we identify the goods and services that are demanded on the network. We 
distinguish between the case where only end-to-end services are demanded and the 
case when there is also demand for some services that do not reach from end to 
end. The case when only end-to-end services exist is easier and has been dealt with 
in much more detail in the literature. However, many important networks, such as 
the railroad and telephone networks, provide both end-to-end and partial coverage 
service. We examine this case later. 
We  start  with  a  simple  case  where  only  end-to-end  services  are  demanded. 
Suppose that there are two complementary types of goods, A and B. Suppose that 
Player i 
Standard  1 
Player 2 
Standard 2 
Standard  1  I  (a, b)  (c, d) 
Standard  2  (e, f)  (g, h) 
.~. 
Fig.  7. 
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each type of good has a number of brands available, Ai, i =  1  .....  m, Bj, j  =  1  ..... 
n, as in Fig. 4. Let consumers demand  1:1 combinations AkB  J. We call each of the 
complementary  goods  A i  or  ~  components, while  the  combined  good  AiBj  is 
called a composite good or system. Potentially all combinations A~Bj, i =  1  .....  m; 
j  =  1  .....  n,  are  possible.  Thus  complementarity  exists  in  potential.  Complemen- 
tarity is  actualized  when  the  components A i and Bj  are combinable and function 
together without extra cost, i.e. when the components are compatible. Often it is an 
explicit decision of the producers of individual components to make their products 
compatible  with  those  of  other  producers.  Thus,  compatibility  is  a  strategic 
decision  and  should be analyzed as  such. 
Modern  industrial  organization  provides  a  rich  collection  of environments  for 
the  analysis  of strategic  decisions;  because  of shortage  of time  and  space,  this 
survey will  discuss  the decision  on compatibility only in  few environments. 
3.3.1.  Mix and match: compatibility  vs. incompatibility 
The  mix-and-match  literature  does  not  assume  a  priori  network  externalities; 
however,  it  is  clear  that  demand  in  mix-and-match  models  exhibits  network 
externalities.  The  mix-and-match  approach  was  originated  by  Matutes  and 
Regibeau  (1988),  and  followed  by  Economides  (1988),  Economides  (1989), 
Economides (199 la),  Economides (199 lb),  Economides (1993c), Economides and 
Salop  (1992),  Economides  and  Lehr  (1995),  Matutes  and  Regibeau  (1989), 
Matutes and Regibeau (1992), and others. To fix ideas, consider the case of Fig. 4 
with  m =  2,  n =  2,  technologies  are  known,  coordination  is  costless,  price 
discrimination  is  not  allowed,  and  there  are  no cost asymmetries  created  by any 
particular  compatibility  standard.  Fig.  8  shows  the  case  of  compatibility.  The 
incentive  for compatibility  of a  vertically  integrated  firm  (producing  A 1 and B~) 
depends  on the relative sizes of each combination of complementary components. 
Reciprocal compatibility,  (i.e.  simultaneous  compatibility between  A I  and B 2,  as 
well  as between  A 2 and B~) increases  demand  (by allowing for the  sale of A IB2 
and  AzBI)  but  also  increases  competition  for the  individual  components.  There- 
A  1  A 2 
B 1  B 2 
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fore,  when  the  hybrid demand  is  large  compared  with  the  own-product  demand 
(including the case where the two demands are equal at equal prices), a firm has an 
incentive to  want  compatibility.  2°  When  the  demand for hybrids is  small,  a  firm 
does  not  want  compatibility• Thus,  it  is  possible,  with  two  vertically integrated 
firms, that one firm wants compatibility (because it has small own-product demand 
compared  with  the  hybrids demand)  while  the  other  one  prefers  incompatibility 
(because  its  own-product  demand  is  large  compared  with  the  hybrids  demand). 
Thus,  there can be conflict across firms in their incentives for compatibility, even 
when the technology is well known. The presumption is that opponents will not be 
able to counteract and correct all incompatibilities introduced by an opponent, and, 
therefore,  in  situations of conflict we expect that  incompatibility wins. 
These  results  hold  both  for  zero-one  decisions  (i.e.  compatibility vs.  incom- 
patibility) and for decisions of partial (or variable) incompatibility. The intuition of 
the  pro-compatibility result  for  the  zero-one  decision  in  the  equal  hybrid-  and 
own-demand is simple. Starting from the same level of prices and demand in both 
the  compatibility and  incompatibility regimes,  consider  a  price  increase  in  one 
component  that  produces  the  same  decrease  in  demand  in  both  regimes.  Under 
incompatibility, the loss of profits is higher since systems  sales are lost rather than 
sales  of  one  component.  Therefore,  profits  are  more  responsive  to  price  under 
incompatibility; it follows that  the  residual  demand  facing  firms  is  more  elastic 
under  incompatibility,  and  therefore  firms  will  choose  lower  prices  in  that 
regime.  2'  This  is reminiscent of Cournot's  (1838)  celebrated result (see Cournot, 
1927) that a  vertically integrated monopolist faces a more elastic demand and will 
choose  a  lower price  than  the  sum  of the  prices  of two  vertically disintegrated 
•  22  monopohsts. 
So  far  we  have  assumed  that  compatibility is  reciprocal  -  i.e.  that  the  same 
adapter is required to make both A ~B  2 and A2B ~ functional. If compatibility is not 
reciprocal (i.e. if different adapters are required for A ~B  2 and A 2B1)  the incentive 
of  firms  to  achieve  compatibility  depends  on  the  cross  substitution  between 
own-products  and  hybrids.  Roughly,  if the  substitutability  among  A-type  com- 
ponents  is  equal  to  the  substitutability  among  B-type  components,  the  earlier 
results  of  the  reciprocal  setup  still  hold.  23  Nevertheless,  if  the  degree  of  sub- 
stitutability among the As is different than among the Bs, one firm may create an 
2C~Matutes and Regibeau (1988) and Economides (1989) find that compatibility is always the firms' 
choice because they assume a locational setting with uniform distribution of consumers in space that 
results in equal own-product and hybrid demands at equal prices. The exposition here follows the more 
general framework of Economides (1988) and Economides (1991a). 
Z'These results also hold when firms can  price discriminate between buyers who buy the pure 
combination A~B  and buyers who buy only one component from firm i. Thus, firms practice mixed 
bundling. See Matutes and Regibeau (1992) and Economides (1993c). 
22 See Economides (1988) for a discussion of Cournot's result, and Economides and Salop (1992) for 
an extension of the result to (parallel) vertical integration among two pairs of vertically related firms. 
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advantage for itself by introducing some incompatibilities. However, it is never to 
the advantage of both  vertically integrated firms to create incompatibilities. 
The issue of compatibility and coordination is much more complicated if there 
are more than  two  firms.  A  number of coalitions  can  each be formed around  a 
specific technical  standard,  and  standards  may allow for partial  compatibility, or 
may be mutually incompatible. Not enough research has been done on this issue. 
Research  in  this  area  is  made  particularly  difficult  by  the  lack  of  established 
models of coalition formation in non-cooperative settings.  The analysis based on 
coalition  structures  is  more complicated in  the  'micro' approach because  of the 
specifics of the  ownership  structure. 
The studies we referred to this far take the ownership structure as given (i.e. as 
parallel  vertical integration),  and  proceed to discuss  the  choice of the  degree  of 
compatibility. In many cases, vertical integration is a decision that is more flexible 
(and  less  irreversible) than  a  decision  on  compatibility.  Thus,  it  makes  sense  to 
think  of  a  game  structure  where  the  choice  of  technology  (which  implies  the 
degree of compatibility) precedes the choice of the degree of vertical integration. 
Economides (1996b)  analyzes the choice of asset ownership as a consequence  of 
the choice of technology (and of the implied degree of compatibility). It posits a 
three-stage game of compatibility choice in the first stage,  vertical integration in 
the  second  stage,  and  price  choice  in  the  third  stage.  Incentives  for  vertical 
mergers  in  industries  with  varying  degrees  of  compatibility  are  compared.  In 
analyzing  the  stage  of compatibility choice,  the  influence  of the  anticipation  of 
decisions  on  (vertical) industry  structure  on compatibility decisions  is evaluated. 
(Fig.  9.) 
3.3.2.  Changes  in the number of varieties as a  result of compatibility  decisions 
Economides (1991b) considers the interplay of compatibility and the number of 
varieties  of  complementary  goods.  There  are  two  types  of  goods,  A  and  B, 
consumed in 1:1 ratio. There are two brands of good A, A~ and A 2, each produced 
by an independent  firm. The number of B-type brands, each also produced by an 
independent firm, is determined by a free-entry condition,  so that industry B  is in 
monopolistic competition. In a regime of compatibility, each B-type component is 
immediately compatible with either A 1 or A z. In a regime of incompatibility, each 
Stage 1  Stage 2  Stage 3 
COMPATIBILITY 
OR 
INCOMPATIBILITY 
VERTICAL 
INTEGRATION OR 
DISINEGRATION 
PRICE 
COMPETITION 
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Compatibility 
Fig.  10. Compatibility. 
brand B i produces two versions, one compatible with A 1 and one compatible with 
A 2.  The two cases are shown in Fig.  10 and Fig.  11. 
Under incompatibility, each B-type firm incurs higher fixed costs; it follows that 
ceteris paribus the number of B-type brands will be smaller under incompatibility. 
An A-type firm prefers incompatibility or compatibility according to the equilib- 
rium  profits  it  realizes  in  each  regime.  These  profits,  and  the  decision  on 
compatibility, depends on the specifics of the utility function of consumers, and in 
particular on the  impact of an  increase  of the  number of varieties on  utility.  If 
Incompatibility 
a;  aj  ...  a, 
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industry  demand  is  not  sensitive  to  increases  in  the  number  of  varieties  of 
composite goods n  (and does not increase much as n  increases), then equilibrium 
profits of an A-type firm decrease in the number of firms; therefore profits of an 
A-type firm are higher at the smaller number of firms implied by incompatibility, 
and  an A-type firm prefers incompatibility.  Conversely, when  consumers  have a 
strong  preference  for  variety  and  demand  for  composite  goods  increases  sig- 
nificantly  in  n,  equilibrium  profits  of an  A-type firm  increase  in  the  number of 
firms;  therefore  its  profits  are  higher  at  the  larger  number  of firms  implied  by 
compatibility, and an A-type firm prefers compatibility. 
Church and Gandal (1992b), Chou and Shy (1990a), Chou and Shy (1990b), and 
Chou  and  Shy  (1990c)  also  examine  the  impact  of the  number  of varieties  of 
complementary (B-type) goods  on the  decisions  of consumers to buy one  of the 
A-type goods under conditions  of incompatibility. 
3.3.3.  Quality coordination  in  mix-and-match 
The  framework of mix  and  match  models  applies  to both  variety and  quality 
features  that  are  combinable  additively  in  the  utility  function.  That  is,  in  the 
standard mix-and-match model, the utility accruing to a consumer from component 
A i  is  added  to  the  utility  from  component  Bj.  However,  in  some  networks, 
•  •  24  including  telecommumcatlons,  the utility of the composite good AiBj  is not the 
sum of the respective qualities. In particular, the quality of voice in a long distance 
call is the minimum of the qualities of the component parts of the network, i.e. the 
local  and  the  long  distance  transmission.  Thus,  significant  quality  coordination 
problems arise in a network with fragmented ownership• Economides (1994b) and 
Economides and Lehr (1995)  examine this coordination problem. 
Let A and B be components that are combinable in a  1:1 ratio. Suppose that the 
quality  levels  of the  components  are  qa  and  qB,  while  the  quality  level  of the 
composite good is qa8 =  min(qA,  qB)" Consumers have varying willingness to pay 
for quality  improvements as  in  Gabszewicz and  Thisse  (1979)  and  Shaked  and 
Sutton (1982), and firms play a two-stage game of quality choice in the first stage, 
followed  by  price  choice  in  the  second  stage.  As  mentioned  earlier,  Cournot 
(1927)  has  shown  that  an  integrated  monopolist  producing  both  A  and  B  will 
charge less than two vertically related monopolists, each producing one component 
only.  This  is  because  of  the  elimination  of  double  marginalization  by  the 
integrated  monopolist•  Economides  (1994b)  and  Economides  and  Lehr  (1995) 
show  that  an  integrated  monopolist also  provides  a  higher  quality  than  the  two 
independent monopolists. In bilateral monopoly, marginal increases in quality have 
a bigger impact on price. Being able to sell the same quality at a higher price than 
under integrated monopoly, the bilateral monopolists choose lower quality levels, 
which  are less costly• Despite that, because of double marginalization, prices are 
Z4See also Encaoua et al. (1992) for a discussion of the coordination of the timing of different legs 
of airport transportation. N. Economides / Int. J. Ind. Organ. 14 (1996) 673-699  691 
higher than  in integrated  monopoly, a  lower portion of the market is  served,  and 
firms realize lower profits 25 Thus, lack of vertical integration  leads" to a  reduction 
in  quality.  Note  that  this  is  not  because  of  lack  of  coordination  between  the 
bilateral  monopolists  in  the  choice  of quality,  since  they  both  choose the  same 
quality  level 26 
In  this  setting,  Economides  and  Lehr  (1995)  examine  various  ownership 
structures where, for at least one of the types of components there is more than one 
quality  level  available.  Clearly,  a  situation  where  all  components  have  the  same 
quality is  not viable,  since competition would then drive prices  to marginal  cost. 
Further,  for  a  'high'  quality  composite  good to be  available,  both  an  A-  and  a 
B-type goods must be of 'high' quality.  They find that a  third  (and fourth)  'low' 
quality  goods  have  a  hard  time  surviving  if they  are  produced  by  independent 
firms. In contrast, in parallel vertical integration (with firm i, i =  1, 2, producing A i 
and  Bi),  firms  prefer  not  to  interconnect  -  i.e.  to  produce  components  that  are 
incompatible  with  those of the opponent. 
4.  Network  externalities  and industry structure 
4.1.  Invitations  to  enter 
In the presence of strong network externalities,  a monopolist exclusive holder of 
a technology may have an incentive to invite competitors and even subsidize them. 
The realization of network externalities requires high output. A monopolist may be 
unable credibly to commit to a  high output as long as he is operating by himself. 
However, if he licenses  the technology to a  number of firms  and invites  them to 
enter and compete with him,  market output will be higher; and since the level of 
market output depends  mainly upon other firms, the commitment to high output is 
credible. 
The  invitation  to enter  and  the  consequent  increase  in  market  output  has  two 
effects;  a  competitive  effect  and  a  network  effect.  The  competitive  effect  is  an 
expected increase  in competition because  of the increase  of the number of firms. 
The network effect tends  to increase  the willingness  to pay and the market price 
because of the high expected sales.  Economides (1993h) and Economides (1996a) 
show that,  if the network externality is  strong enough, the network effect is larger 
than  the  competitive  effect,  and  therefore  an  innovator-monopolist  invites  com- 
petitors  and  even  subsidizes  them  on  the  margin  to  induce  them  to  increase 
production. 
25 Consumers also receive lower surplus in comparison to vertically integrated monopoly. 
26The reliability of the network, measured by the percentage of time that the network is in operation, 
or by  the  probability of a  successful connection, is  measured by  the  product of the  respective 
reliabilities of the components (another non-linear function). 692  N. Economides / Int. J. Ind. Organ. 14 (1996) 673-699 
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Fig. 12. AB is a bottleneck facility. 
4.2.  Interconnection  or foreclosure  by a  local monopolist? 
Many  telecommunications,  airline  networks  and  railroad  networks  have  the 
structure of Fig.  12.  In a railroad network, there may be direct consumer demand 
for  links  AB,  BC,  as  well  as  AC.  This  figure  can  also  represent  a  telephone 
network  with  demand  for  local  telephone  services  (AB)  and  for  long  distance 
services  (ABC);  in  that  case,  there  is  no  direct  demand  for  BC,  but  only  the 
indirect demand arising from long distance calls ABC. In many cases, one firm has 
a monopoly of a link that is necessary for a number of services (here AB), and this 
link is a natural monopoly. This bottleneck link is often called an essential facility. 
The monopolist can foreclose any finn by denying access to the bottleneck facility. 
What are his  incentives do so? 
Economides and Woroch (1992) examine intermodal competition in the context 
of a simple network pictured in Fig.  13. S and R are local switches; AS and BR is 
local service (in different cities);  SR and STR are alternative long distance services. 
The  diagram  is  simplified  by eliminating  R  without any essential  loss.  Suppose 
that an integrated firm offers end-to-end service (ASB), while a second firm offers 
Network in Extensive and Collapsed Form 
A 
A 
SI  IT 
B 
Fig. 13. Intermodal competition. N. Economides / Int. J. Ind. Organ. 14 (1996) 673-699  693 
service of partial coverage only (STB). They find that, although the integrated firm 
has  the  opportunity  to  foreclose  the  opponent,  it  prefers  not  to.  In  fact,  the 
integrated firm  is  better  off  by  implementing  a  vertical price  squeeze  on  the 
opponent,  and charging a  significantly higher price to the opponent for the use of 
the monopolized link than it 'charges' itself.  27 Thus, foreclosure, although feasible, 
is  not optimal for the  integrated  firm28 
Economides  and  Woroch  (1992)  also  find  that  vertical  disintegration  is  not 
desirable  for  the  firm  that  offers  end-to-end  service.  Once  disintegrated,  its 
constituent parts realize lower total profits.  This  is because,  besides  appropriating 
monopoly rents  for  its  AS  monopoly, the  integrated  firm  (ASB)  was  creating  a 
significant  restriction  of competition  in  SB-STB  market  by  its  de  facto  price 
discriminating  strategy.  After disintegration,  the  SB-STB  market  becomes  much 
more competitive, even if AS price discriminates between SB and STB. Thus, even 
if network ASB  were to receive the full  rent earned by the new owner of SB,  its 
after-divestiture  profits  would be  lower than before divestiture 29 
Even in  simple  networks,  there  may be  relations  among firms  that  are  neither 
purely vertical nor purely horizontal. Thus, the conventional wisdom about vertical 
and  horizontal  integration  fails.  Economides  and  Salop  (1992)  discuss  pricing  in 
various  ownership  structures  in  the  model  of Fig.  8.  They  call  the  ownership 
structure  of this  figure,  where  each  firm  produces  a  component  of each  type, 
parallel  vertical  integration.  They  also  consider  the  independent  ownership 
structure, where each of the four components is owned by a different firm. In both 
of these  structures,  no  firm  is  purely  vertically  or purely  horizontally  related  to 
another firm. Thus,  starting from independent ownership,  or starting from parallel 
vertical  integration,  a  merger  to  joint  ownership,  where  all  components  are 
produced  by the  same  firm,  can either  increase  or decrease  prices.  Thus,  simple 
prescriptions  against  mergers  may easily fail. 
In  the  model  of Fig.  13,  Economides  and  Woroch  (1992)  consider  the  case 
where link ST is owned by a firm that owns a vertically related link (either AS or 
BT),  or is  owned by an  independent  firm.  Clearly,  the  strategic  structure  of the 
game remains unaffected when link ST changes hands between two firms that also 
own a link that is vertically related to ST. Therefore, if ST has a fixed cost, it is a 
liability to such a  firm; each firm would like the opponent to own it.  However, if 
the  link  is  owned  by  a  third  party,  it  is  has  a  positive  value  because  of  its 
monopoly position in the chain. Thus, each original owner has an incentive to sell 
ST  to a  third  party.  The  direct  implication  is  that the  value  of links  depends  on 
27This result is dependent on the linear structure of the demand system, and may not hold for any 
demand structure. 
28 Church and Gandal (1992a) find that sometimes firms prefer foreclosure, but their model does not 
allow for a vertical price squeeze. 
29This result is in contrast to Bonanno and Vickers (1988) because of the absence of two-part 
contracts in Economides and Woroch (1992). 694  N. Economides  /  Int.  J. Ind.  Organ.  14 (1996) 673-699 
what  other  links  a  firm  owns.  Thus,  general  prescriptions  on  the  desirability of 
unbundling  of ownership are suspect. 
Often parts of the network are regulated, while other parts  are not.  This  is the 
typical arrangement in telephony in the US, where only local telephone companies 
are  tightly  regulated,  since  their  market  is  traditionally  considered  a  natural 
monopoly.  3°  Baumol  and  Sidak (1994a)  and  Baumol  and  Sidak (1994b)  propose 
that,  to  attract  efficient  entrants  in  the  long  distance  market  and  to  discourage 
inefficient entrants, a local telephone company should charge them an interconnec- 
tion  (or  access)fee  equal  to  the  marginal  cost of provision of service plus  any 
opportunity cost that the local telephone company incurs.  3~  This is correct under a 
set  of strict  assumptions:  first that  the  end-to-end good  is  sold originally at  the 
competitive price; second that the entrant produces the same complementary good 
(long distance service) as the  incumbent; 32  third,  that  there  are no  economies  of 
scale  in  either  one  of  the  complements.  Economides  and  White  (1995)  and 
Economides  and  White  (1996)  discuss  how  the  relaxation of these  assumptions 
leads to different interconnection charges. For example, if competition between an 
entrant and the incumbent reduces the market power of the incumbent, entry may 
increase  social  welfare  even  when  the  entrant  produces  at  higher  cost  than  the 
incumbent. 
5.  Sequential games 
In network markets,  and  more generally in markets with network externalities, 
when  firms  and  consumers  interact  in  more  than  period,  history  matters.  Both 
consumers  and  firms make production and  consumption decisions based on  sizes 
of  installed  base  and  on  expectations  of  its  increases  over  time.  The  same 
underlying  technology  and  consumers  preferences  and  distribution  can  lead  to 
different  industrial  structures  depending  on  the  way  things  start.  Thus,  strategic 
advantages,  such  as first mover advantages,  can have  long run  effects.  33 
Network  externalities  and  historical  events  are  particularly  important  in  the 
speed  of  adoption  of  an  innovation  that  creates  services  on  a  network.  Cabral 
(1990)  discusses  the  adoption  of  innovations  under  perfect  competition  in  the 
presence  of  network  externalities.  His  main  conclusion  is  that,  when  network 
externalities are strong, the equilibrium adoption path may be discontinuous. This 
3°This is changing for some customers through the existence of competitive access providers, who 
directly  compete with the  local  telephone company for  large  customers, and  the  potential  for 
competition by cable companies. 
3~ Kahn and Taylor (1994) have very similar views. 
32Armstrong and Doyle (1994) relax this assumption. 
33 See Arthur (1988), Arthur (1989), David (1985). David argues that the QWERTY keyboard was 
adopted mainly because it appeared first while the DVORAK keyboard was superior. This is disputed 
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is another way of saying that there are two network sizes supported as equilibria at 
the  same time  instant.  This  may occur at the  start of the  network,  and  then  it  is 
called positive critical  mass by Economides  and  Himmelberg (1995).  It may also 
occur  at other  points  in  the  network  evolution.  In practice,  discontinuities  in  the 
size of the network over time do not occur since that would imply an infinite  size 
of sales at some points in time. Continuity  and smoothness of the network path is 
restored  if  instantaneous  marginal  production  costs  are  increasing.  Under  this 
assumption,  Economides  and  Himmelberg  (1995)  find  that  the  adoption  path  is 
much steeper in the presence of externalities.  Further,  driven by the externality,  in 
early  stages  the  network  can  expand  so  quickly  as  to  exhibit  increasing  retail 
prices even when marginal costs are falling over time. Their analysis is applied to 
the  fax  market  in  the  US  and  Japan. 
The analysis  is  more complex  when  we depart  from the  assumption  of perfect 
competition.  Accordingly,  this  analysis  tends  to  be  in  the  form  of  simple  two- 
period  models. We  analyze  it  with  reference  to the  standard  simultaneous  choice 
coordination  game  of Section  3.2.5,  where  we  now  interpret  the  first strategy  as 
sticking to the old technology,  and the second as the adoption of a  new one (Fig. 
14).  Network  externalities  for  both  technologies  mean  that  a  >  c,  e;  b >  d,  f; 
g >  c, e; h >  d, f. If both firms are worse off when they are not coordinated,  both 
the  'new technology'  (i.e.  (N, N)) and the  'old technology'  (i.e.  (O, O)) will arise 
as  equilibria.  Clearly,  one  of  the  equilibria  can  be  inefficient.  If  the  (O,  O) 
equilibrium  is  inefficient  and  is  adopted,  Farrell  and  Saloner  (1985)  call  the 
situation  excess  inertia.  34  Similarly, if the (N, N) equilibrium  is inefficient and it is 
adopted,  the  situation  is  called  excess  momentum. 
Farrell  and  Saloner  (1985)  discuss  a  two-period  model  where  consumers  have 
varying willingness  to pay for the change of the technology,  measured by 0. Users 
can  switch  in  Period  1  or  2,  and  switching  is  irreversible.  Users  fall  in  four 
categories  according to the strategy they pick:  (i) they never switch,  whatever the 
behavior  of others  in  the  first  period;  (ii)  they  switch  in  Period  2  if other  users 
Player 2 
New Technology  Old Technology 
"N  ....  O" 
Player 1 
New Technology,,N,,  l  (a, b)  (c, d) 
Old Technology  (e, f)  (g, h) 
"O" 
Fig.  14. 
34See Katz and Shapiro (1992) for a different view arguing for excess momentum (which they call 
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have switched in Period 1 -  jumping on the bandwagon; (iii) they switch in Period 
1;  (iv)  switch  in Period  2  even if others  have not switched  in Period  1.  The last 
strategy  is  dominated  by  strategy  (iii).  Consumers  of  low  0  use  strategy  (i), 
consumers of intermediate 0 use strategy (ii), and consumers of high 0 use strategy 
(iii).  Consumers would like to coordinate themselves and switch in the first period 
(thereby  getting  the  bandwagon  rolling)  but  are  unable  to  do  so,  thus  creating 
excess  inertia.  This  inertia  can  be  reduced  through  communication  among  the 
consumers,  though contracts, through coordination in committees or through new 
product sponsorship  and  special  introductory pricing.  35 
In a  sequential  setting,  preannouncement  (i.e.  announcement of a  new product 
before  its  introduction)  may  induce  some  users  to  delay  their  purchase.  Also 
penetration  pricing  can  be  important.  Katz  and  Shapiro  (1986a)  examine  the 
effects  of sponsorship  (allowing firms to price differently than  at  marginal  cost). 
Katz and  Shapiro (1986b)  examine the effects of uncertainty in product adoption 
and introduction. 
Nevertheless,  there  is  much  more  work  to  be  done  on  multiperiod  and  on 
continuous  time  dynamic  games  with  network  externalities.  The  issues  of 
foreclosure  and  predation  have  not been  sufficiently  discussed  in  the  context  of 
network externalities.  More generally, much more work is required on multiperiod 
dynamic games  in this  context,  especially for durable  goods. 
6.  Markets for adapters and add-ons 
Not enough research has been done on the economics of adapters and interfaces. 
One strand of the mix-and-match literature  assumes that compatibilities introduced 
by  one  firm  cannot  be  corrected  by  the  other,  so  that  adapters  are  unfeasible. 
Economides (1991a) assumes that adapters  are provided by a competitive industry 
at  cost,  but  decisions  of the  firms  determine  the  extent  of incompatibility,  and 
therefore  the  cost  of  the  adapters.  Farrell  and  Saloner  (1992)  assume  that 
converters  make  the  technologies  only  partially  compatible,  in  the  sense  that 
hybrid  goods  that  utilize  incompatible  components  as  well  as  an  adapter  give 
lower  utility  than  a  system  composed  of fully  compatible  components.  In  this 
framework,  the  availability  of converters  can reduce  social welfare,  since,  in  the 
presence of converters, some consumers would buy the converter and the 'inferior' 
technology rather than the  'best' technology, although the  'best' technology gives 
more externalities. 
35See also Farrell and  Saloner (1988) for mechanisms to achieve coordination, and Farrell and 
Saloner (1985) for a discussion of network product sponsorship. N. Economides  /  Int.  J.  Ind.  Organ.  14 (1996) 673-699  697 
7.  Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we have noted some of the interesting issues that arise in networks 
and  vertically  related  industries,  especially  in  the  presence  of  a  fragmented 
ownership structure. As is evident, many open questions remain. One of the most 
important issues that remains largely unresolved is the joint determination of an 
equilibrium market structure (including the degree of vertical integration) together 
with  the  degree  of  compatibility across  firms.  The  extent  of  standardization in 
markets with more than two participants and the structure of 'standards' coalitions 
also  remain  open  questions.  Markets  for  adapters  and  add-ons  have  not  been 
sufficiently analyzed.  An  analysis  of  market  structure  in  multiperiod  dynamic 
games with network externalities is also unavailable. Further, issues of predation 
and  foreclosure  in  networks  have  not  been  fully  analyzed  yet.  On  a  more 
fundamental level, there is no good prediction yet of the  'break points' that define 
the complementary components in a modular design structure. Even if these break 
points are  known, little analysis has  been done of competition in a  multilayered 
structure of vertically related components. Nevertheless, it is exactly this kind of 
modelling that is needed for an analysis and evaluation of the potential structures 
of the  'information superhighway'. 
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